CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

2 August 1955

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. LL-55

SUBJECT: Post Mortems on NIE 63.1-55, "Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956;" NIE 63.2-55, "Probable Developments in Cambodia through July 1956;" and NIE 63.3-55, "Probable Developments in Laos through July 1956."

- We do not believe a full scale post mortem need be undertaken on this series. However, we did encounter several intelligence gaps which we believe should be noted by the IAC and circulated among the agencies.
- The principal intelligence gaps in the coverage of each area are as follows:
 - (a) North Vietnamo With the exception of a few reports concerning the attitudes of the people in Hanoi, there were almost no reports concerning the reaction of the bulk of the population to Communist control.
 - (b) Cambodia, There exists practically no information concerning Communist activities, strength or capabilities in Cambodia. While Communist strength in Cambodia is not believed to be significant at the present time, this is nevertheless an important deficiency,

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(c) Laos. There is an almost complete lack of intelligence of any kind on the extent, nature and capabilities of the Pathet Lao outside the two provinces they occupy, and only little information concerning them within their two provinces.

Moreover, aside from a few conflicting reports there is no firm intelligence on Viet Minh relations with the Pathet Lao or Viet Minh activities in Laos.